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Abstract 
A long tradition has used logic for the description of connectors and other linguistic for-
mators. It is argued in this article that this in fact is not a good idea. After an analysis of
the meaning of connectors, as they have been studied in linguistics, their formal function
is scrutinized. It is shown that one ought to distinguish their iconic function, which is the
only one studied by linguists so far, from their deictic function, which controls the search
for their arguments. This result permits us to address the crucial question: Why has logic
acquired such a predominant place in the study of natural connectors? What is the basis
for this way of viewing their function? It is finally shown how the insights obtained in
this analysis can be exploited for the examination of the formal aspects of other linguistic
items.
1. Introduction 
Until recently, discussions about meaning have not paid much attenti-
on to those expressions which have no meaning, or at least no referential
meaning in the usual sense. These expressions, which may be called
syncategoremata, following the schoolmen, formators, following Charles
Morris (1938), or logical words (e.g. Geoffrey Leech 1974)), have often
been considered as contributing invariably to the whole meaning of the
sentence. They are held to be “internal to linguistics” (Leech 1974, 161),
their function being totally independent of pragmatic concepts like
discourse situation, background knowledge etc. Accordingly, they are
mostly analysed in terms of logic and the composition axiom (cf. Frege
1952). Thus the meaning of connectors, on which I shall concentrate in
this article, is seen by the mainstream of research as being determined by
combinatorial rules applying to the truth value of atomic elements.
From a historical point of view, this is a surprising situation. Indeed,
1 This article is a slightly updated version of a part of a manuscript that I wrote in 1984
with Jean Widmer from Fribourg in Switzerland. Though it contains mainly the sections
for which I was chiefly responsible, this text would not have been possible without the
ideas and insights of Jean Widmer. Further, it has not been possible to pay sufficient
attention to very recent developments of linguistic theory. In particular, it seems proba-
ble that the Relevance Theory developed by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (e.g.
1986) could well turn out to become of extreme interest for the kind of problems dealt
with in this article.
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the symbolization of logic was not introduced by Aristotele owing to its
advantages for calculating, but because it allowed a more stable repres-
entation of the kind of relations that were to be studied, i.e., it institutio-
nalized a kind of abstraction. Now, if one considers these efforts, one
may well wonder how logicians, and linguists, came to use uncritically
the now well developed symbolic logic as a model for the function of
connectors in natural languages, particularly since this logic was not for-
mulated to explain natural languages, but rather to introduce cognitive
dissociation from them2.
Admittedly, this state of affairs has changed during the last years in
which much work has been done on some particular expressions without
referential meaning. I shall refer especially to the work of the French lin-
guist Oswald Ducrot and his colleagues, and occasionally to the recent
development of Relevance Theory (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986). But
even in this line of analysis, there is implicitly, or sometimes explicitly,
the assumption that symbolic logic can be used as an unproblematic de-
scriptive model for words like and, or and if…then. In the present article
I will argue against this widespread conception. Logic is in fact a poor
model for the description of (natural) connectors because the different
aspects of meaning (one of which is the generic, or the formal aspect in
the sense of formal logic) are always intimately related in natural langua-
ge. That this is so is not only attested through the very tradition of logic
touched upon above; it is also confirmed by the fact that logical combi-
nations occur in cases where no explicit connector can be found. Thus, if
one takes seriously the theoretical claim that the meaning of utterances is
always dialogic, this dimension should show up also in the description of
natural connectors. Further, since real communication always occurs by
means of utterances, the time dimension of speaking should be dealt
with. As we shall see, this dimension is central, as it offers the very scene
for the inner temporal course of interpretation. In fact it plays a double
role, since the time of production is necessarily linear, whereas the time
of interpretation may anticipate or cycle back to previous points located
during the time of speech production.
Consequently, I shall have to deal with essentially two questions: How
can logic have been used as a model (i.e. what is the basis for this way of
viewing the function of natural connectors), and how are these logical
formal aspects related to the speech situation?
2 Actually, as we shall see, some aspects of the natural function of connectors still re-
main intact even in formal logic.
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In order to approach an answer to these two questions I will try to give
a systematic account of the behaviour of connectors. It is not my intenti-
on to produce analyses of particular connectors; what I want to do is to
present a model for their general function. My approach is clearly inter-
pretative, as its focus is on interpretative work, assuming tacitly that the
production side anticipates just this work. As a consequence, I shall,
against usual practice, move from pragmatics to syntax instead of the
other way around. Thus against the Saussurian tradition, I do not treat the
language system as self–contained. I shall in fact allow for some kind of
embedded pragmatics. This procedure will enable me to show a number
of structuring aspects which logic in its standard forms is not able to
account for, and I shall conclude that logic is a poor model even for the
description of these “logical words”.
2. The meaning of connectors 
Before I look at how some linguists have treated connectors I will
have to consider the relation between the meaning of referential terms
and the meaning of logical words. After this I will describe how this
meaning is internally dialogic by presenting briefly the polyphonic theo-
ry developed by Oswald Ducrot.
2.1. The function of formators 
The first distinction aims to conceptualize the relations between as-
pects of meaning which originate both in explicit linguistic tokens and 
in the utterance situation, especially in the following features of this situ-
ation: the seriality of speech production, the inner-temporal course of
interpretations and the relevant identities of communicators (cf. 2.2.).
One may conceptualize these aspects of meaning by using a distinction
suggested by R. Ingarden (1929): the distinction between material, for-
mal and modal aspects of meaning. I do not take this distinction in an
ontological sense as Ingarden did. For me the material aspect of meaning
concerns the fact that any utterance is talking about some universe of
discourse, its material. This aspect draws on conventionalized, as well as
on more vernacular knowledge, according to the kind of speech. The for-
mal aspect concerns the aspects generally highlighted by logic (quantifi-
cation, inferences etc.) as well as distinctiveness and objectivity. The
modal aspect of meaning has to do with the various ways we speak. I
shall touch on this aspect when introducing the polyphonic theory in 2.2.
Here I want to consider some relations between material and formal
aspects, limiting my considerations to those relations which are relevant
for the questions of logical connectiveness in the usual sense.
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The sense of expressions in an utterance is used as material for inter-
preting what is said (the material meaning) not only on the basis of lexe-
mes, syntactic location and rules, but as something used by the speaker to
tell more than his words can say — for “speaking between the lines”.
What you say is only a “gloss” of what you want to tell, since what is
told always involves an indefinite amount of world knowledge, a point
stressed by John R. Searle (1978; 1980), and many years earlier by the
ethnomethodologists (Garfinkel 1967, 24-31; Garfinkel & Sacks 1970).
This world knowledge is always knowledge about a practical world in
the sense that it is a world known, produced and organized by the same
people who talk about it (thus reproducing and sometimes even increa-
sing world knowledge). That is to say it is a structured knowledge, and
its structures are implicitly used in order to interpret what is told from
what is said3. Thus we may find many examples of implications, exclusi-
ons etc. which are used implicitly, without connectors. Examples can be
found in Leech (1974, 162). Leech notes also that many logical words
include non-logical elements designating time, place, movement, person
etc.4.
Thus we may ask, as Leech does: Why does language use formators
at all?
Leech answers this question by arguing that “these elements greatly
increase the power of human thinking, because they are instruments with
which we can explicitly manipulate the categories and relationships of
meaning which exist on the level of semantic representation” (ibid. 163).
This functionalist argument seems to imply that the formators are intro-
duced just because they are useful, and it does not explain how they
function. In this connection Roland Posner (1980, 196-197) makes a very
useful remark. He shows that the strength of what he refers to as a con-
nexity suggestion depends on the degree of embedding of the clause con-
cerned in the entire sentence, or on how high the verb of propositional
attitude is in the structure of the sentence. Since he understands suggesti-
ons as pragmatically induced, this leads him to the observation that a hig-
her degree of explicitness increases the literal (semantic) meaning and
cancels suggestions. I will express this in my framework by saying that
3 This idea is in fact the backbone of the Relevance Theory developed by Sperber &
Wilson (1986).
4 This connection between logical words and references to places, times and persons i.
e. the references of indexical terms, should cause no surprise in natural language, and
interestingly, we find the same connections in modal logic.
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explicit logical work takes precedence over logical work which is impli-
cit in the interpretation of meaning, and this is exactly why formators
are used. That the logical features of the formators take precedence over
the implicit logical operations is not to say that they cancel several logi-
cal operations. The cancellation is selective. Thus and can seem to carry
relations of time, place consecutions etc. (cf. Posner 1980), which are in
fact not grounded in the formator, but in the interpretation of meaning.
Leech (1974) is right in implying that meaning, interpretation and logical
operations are inseparable. This account also explains why the “literal-
ness” of formators increases the more deeply embedded they are: Each
new formator cancels implicit operations which are replaced by the new
operations which are run through the formators. To say “new operations”
is to say that natural discourse has a limit for how many formators should
be used. This fact is nicely explained by the Principle of Relevance from
Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986, 158)5. Since new operations
cause extra effort of interpretation they may only be permitted if this
extra effort is counterbalanced by greater contextual effect. Otherwise
they decrease the degree of relevance. In fact there seems to be even
more involved. The usual formators (and the logical functors) seem to
carry specific kinds of operations, viz. operations that can be formalized,
i.e. drawn out of the mist of meaning interpretation. This accounts for the
development of sentence formators as “pure” logical words in contrast
with phrasal formators which tend towards being more mixed up with
material meaning, with the exception of negation. This fact suggests that
these formators do not handle “word meaning” but rather syntagmatically
determined meaning. The pragmatic system I shall suggest in the second
section of this article exploits this hypothesis which, and I would like to
stress this fact, forces us ultimately to reject Frege’s composition axiom
as a method.
2.2. The theory of polyphony 
The main problem with Leech’s description of formators seems to be
that his approach analyses meanings independently of any context (1974,
30ff). Now, if I am right in believing that most formators are mixed up
with material meaning I have to introduce the notion of context into the
system in a principled way. Of course I do not have to analyse the con-
cept of context itself, but from a theoretical point of view it seems very
5 “Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own
optimal relevance”.
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important to maintain a clear distinction between the sense of the expres-
sions, i.e. out of any context, and their meaning as part of the utterance
act, i.e. their occasional meaning in context.
Exactly this distinction is the backbone of the theoretical work of
Oswald Ducrot (cf. for instance Ducrot 1980a;b). He and his students
have worked out a theory of polyphony and argumentation which turns
out to be particularly suitable to treat the function of connectors in natu-
ral language. Ducrot starts by saying that meaning (Ducrot: “le sens”) is
the semantic description of the utterance. We must thus talk of an actual
meaning, which depends both on the utterance act including its location
(the utterance situation) and on the content of the sentence. To the sen-
tence conceived of as an abstract object of linguistics, we attach a seman-
tic description which we call  the sense (Ducrot: “la signification”).
Ducrot argues, as I do, that the linguistic sense is totally different in natu-
re from that of the utterance meaning. This sense has to be seen as a set
of conditions or instructions for the interpretation of the meaning, or as a
set of strategies which the interpreter must follow. Let me stress this
point: The sense is not a sort of minimal or incomplete meaning which
will be completed during the interpretation process. Note that this ap-
proach offers a solution to the literal meaning problem (cf. Searle 1980).
There simply is no literal meaning in the naive sense, since all meaning
depends on context. On the other hand, we have the sentence sense
which, in a certain sense, seems to account for the intuition behind all
this pretheoretic talk of literal meaning. Only — and this is exactly the
crucial point — the sentence sense is not a meaning in the technical
sense of this term.
Now in a certain sense the meaning of the utterance signal (l’”énon-
cé”) is a description of the locutionary act (l’”énonciation”)6. The utter-
ance signal shows the locutionary act as communicating a certain number
of points of view on different states of affairs, propositional contents and
so on. The basic idea behind the polyphonic theory is actually that every
utterance may involve several such “embedded” discourses7. More ex-
6 Lyons (1977:26) proposes the terms ´utterance signal´ and ´utterance act´ in order to
capture this important distinction between the utterance seen as an act (l´énonciation) or
as the result of this act (l´énoncé). As the subtle difference between utterance act in this
sense and locutionary act does not matter for my purpose I have opted for the more
established term here.
7 As I will use the polyphonic theory only as sort of a conceptual framework in this ar-
ticle, I shall content myself with presenting the main ideas behind it. For a more thor-
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actly, the meaning of the utterance consists of the superposition of a cer-
tain number of elementary discourses. The important point is that other
points of view than the speaker’s may be present in this way, and that
these individual points of view may even be marked or indicated at the
sentence level, i.e. by the linguistic material. The negation is the canoni-
cal example:
(1) This wall is not white.
One has a clear intuition of the simultaneous presence in this utterance
of two incompatible points of view. In fact, the use of the negation seems
to be explained by a desire of the speaker to show that somebody proba-
bly thinks (or might have thought) that the wall is actually white, which
is not the fact according to the speaker. To formalize this observation we
will say that the negation (not) induces a polyphonic structure into the
sentence consisting of two (incompatible) viewpoints v1: ‘This wall is
white’ and v2: ‘v1 is wrong’8. Empirical arguments for the presence at
the sentence level of these two distinct viewpoints are to be found in the
study of the possible continuations of (1):
(2) a. [(1)], which you know very well.
b. [(1)], which my neighbor thinks.
c. [(1)], on the contrary.
Whereas a. connects to v2, b. and c. take v1 as their starting point. It is
very interesting to note that the speaker may connect directly to a
viewpoint from which he explicitly dissociates himself. That is the case
in (2b.) and (2c.). Incidentally we notice that whereas we know from the
utterance of (1) who is responsible for v2 (that is the speaker), we cannot
tell who is associated with the other viewpoint (v1). All we know is that
it is not the speaker9, and it becomes a central concern of the interpretati-
ough introduction I refer to Ducrot (1984) or Nølke (1989). In the latter work, I have
outlined an elaboration of the theory which aims at anchoring it in the formal structure
of language.
8 In the first versions of the theory, Ducrot talked about (illocutionary) act instead of
viewpoints. This explains the perhaps somewhat unfortunate name of polyphony. In fact
inasmuch as it is a question of acts we may say that several voices are speaking at the
same time in the utterance, hence the term polyphony. Today Ducrot prefers the term
primitive acts, but as even this term seems a little odd, since what we try to capture is
certainly not an act in the normal sense of the word, I prefer the more neutral term
viewpoint (see Nølke 1989 for a longer terminological discussion).
9 In marked context it may even be a (former) instance of the speaker as in “Well, in
fact the wall is not white”.
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on process to try to anchor this other viewpoint, even though this rela-
tion, of course, may be left unspecified.
Let us introduce a little terminology in order to capture these nuances.
I would like to emphasize that all these concepts are located at the sen-
tence level. The polyphonic structure is in fact considered as a property
of language inscribed in the sentence. I shall use the following definiti-
ons: 
The speaker (le “locuteur”) is the producer of the locutionary act accor-
ding to the utterance. He may leave traces in the sentence, e.g. the
pronoun I. 
The recipient (l’”allocutaire”) is the individual for whom the utterance is
produced. The second person pronouns are among the traces he lea-
ves in the sentence. 
The discourse individuals (the DI) are the individuals who can be held
responsible for the viewpoints expressed in and by the utterance. 
Besides the speaker and the recipient, several other DIs may be intro-
duced during the discourse process or may be already present in the uni-
verse of discourse, i.e. being part of the world knowledge (cf. 2.1.). Even
vague groups of individuals may be DIs in this technical sense. Thus, the
DI responsible for a presupposed viewpoint is a set of members of the
speech community supposed to share the presupposed viewpoint (accor-
ding to the utterance containing the presupposition)10. Of course, as we
shall see, it is now a crucial part of the interpretation process to establish
the relations between the DI and all the expressed viewpoints, which is
tantamount to uncovering the relevant identities of communicators.
This theory is of importance for the analysis of connectors since the
scope of natural formators is not restricted in the way logical functors
are. In particular, there is normally not a fixed range of syntactic ele-
ments which can serve as arguments for them. It is more a fixed combi-
nation of whatever is found. Thus Posner (1980, 191) proposes the fol-
lowing example as a case of contradiction based upon the fact that con-
junctivity is a semantic feature of and:
10 Note that contrary to Ducrot I no longer talk about “énonciateurs” as “senders of the
viewpoints”. In so far as a viewpoint apparently never has “targets” specified at the sen-
tence level it seems to me that it is unnecessary to talk at this level of a sender and a
recipient of the viewpoint. Of course this decision is a consequence of the abandonment
of the dynamic conception of the viewpoints which underlies the term ´act´used by
Ducrot.
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(3) Peter married Annie and Annie had a baby: the comple-
te sentence is true, but one of its constituent sentences is
false.
Although it is true that conjunctivity is a semantic feature of and (I
shall say an iconic feature, cf. 3.3.), it does not follow that (3) is necessa-
rily a contradiction for natural speakers since they may take and as joi-
ning not two propositional contents but two utterance acts, thus hier-
archizing the whole sentence in a distinct way11. This interpretation may
appear for example when (3) is part of a guessing game. Or consider the
following trivial example:
(4) I will speak about formators, or logical words.
(4) may be interpreted as meaning that I will speak alternatively of
one or the other, but the usual interpretation is that I will speak of what
can be called formators, or can be called logical words. The polyphonic
structure of the whole sentence is in this case something like:
(4’) v1: ‘I will speak about X’
v2: ‘X is called formators’
v3: ‘X is called logical words’
and or has as arguments the two implicit (embedded) viewpoints v2 and
v312.
2.3. Connectors in linguistics 
I have already had the opportunity to mention some of the proposals
and ideas due to Leech (1974) and Posner (1980). Posner’s analysis of
and will be discussed in more detail later (in 4.4.). Here I shall briefly
survey other linguistic literature on the subject.
In the work of traditional linguists we find many good remarks on the
“meaning” of connectors but rarely any really systematic descriptions.
Sydney Greenbaum (1969) may be mentioned as a remarkable exception.
He concentrates, however, on syntactic features in the classical structura-
list sense, and his semantic analysis remains on a purely descriptive
level. What we may retain from his work is that many of the semantic
features he uncovers cut across the syntactic classes he operates with, a
11 Of course natural speech does not sustain systematically the theoretical distinction I
have introduced between ´sentence´ and ´utterance´. In theoretical terms only utterances
can be true or false. Sentences merely have truth conditions.
12 The speaker accepts these two viewpoints without associating himself with them.
See Nølke (1989) for an analysis of the different possible relations between the DI and
the viewpoints.
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fact which should not astonish us when we consider the extent to which
semantic interpretation is dependent on logic (cf. 2.1.).
A more systematic description of connectors might be expected to be
found in the general linguistic theories. However, in the Chomskyan
Transformational Grammar, for instance, we find something about quan-
tifiers and negation, and J.R. Ross (1986) studies some general properties
of coordination, but the constituting properties of the connectors are
hardly ever examined.
Not surprisingly it is the more logically oriented semantic theories
(e.g. Montague grammars) that offer the most systematic accounts. The
basic idea here is that the connectors should be translated into logical
functors13. The problem is now how to deal with the obvious differences
in meaning and function between the linguistic and the logical expressi-
ons (Posner 1980; Givón 1982). The solutions based on the Gricean max-
ims do not give any systematic description of these words, mainly be-
cause they pay very little attention to the serial, temporal dimension of
discourse. In fact, the Gricean rules give one a good (although unsyste-
matic) way of describing what happens, but as an interpretative gloss
which does not account for how or why this orderliness is produced, if
we are not to take his rules as norms, a move which would be still more
problematic. The recent model semantic approaches (e.g. Barwise & Per-
ry 1983; Kamp 1981; Meulen 1983; Nef 1988) appear to be of no help
here. They can be seen as attempts to explicate the background know-
ledge, and some well defined parts of it have actually been formalized.
However, they consider the background knowledge as built up of atomic
objects and their relations, and do not really take into account the tempo-
ral dimension of discourse, which is in fact, I shall argue, crucial for the
understanding of how the connectors work.
The recently developed Relevance Theory seems much more promis-
ing. With its radical switch in the status of the notion of relevance, which
in this theory becomes a constitutional property of language, it might
well be able to give a proper account of the behaviour of connectors. In
any case, it has already permitted some steps to be taken towards a syste-
matic analysis of the so-called “discourse particles” which by and large
correspond to the connectors. Thus Diana Blakemore (1987) has shown
that discourse particles (and, but, after all, …) function as constraints
13 See for instance Karolak (1988), who gives an excellent introduction to the general
logical approach to linguistic connectors.
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working directly on the interpretation process (her so-called constraints
on relevance) without interacting with the building up of the proposi-
tional content. Yet, so far it is hard to tell whether this new approach may
ultimately bring new insights into the important role the temporal dimen-
sion plays in this connection.
Finally, I have myself argued elsewhere (Nølke 1990b) that two clas-
ses of connectors should be distinguished: the (genuine) synthetic con-
nectors whose primary function it is to establish connexity, and the ana-
lytic connectors which, having another primary function, only indirectly
induce this special type of semantic cohesion. However, as my main con-
cern in this article is the study of the structure of the connector function,
I shall disregard this difference below.
This brief survey of the linguistic literature on connectors seems to
reveal a rather heterogeneous situation. Many detailed analyses have
been suggested, but there does not exist any general study, and it seems
that the more profound the analyses are the more heterogeneous they are.
On one point, however, most linguists seem to agree: There is some-
how a narrow relation between the connectors and a “logical level”, and
in this sense connectors have a constant semantic function. But even if it
is acknowledged that much logical work is performed without the expli-
cit use of formators, no proper reasoning has ever been offered with
respect to the relationship in a particular sentence between the connectors
and the other parts of the sentence14.
3. Functions of connectors 
The analysis of the formal aspects of meaning concerns quantification,
the specification of reference, as well as what is called the logical relati-
ons among semantic units. Our model primarily tries to account for the
expressions which have as their function to contribute to the establish-
ment of semantic coherence (or cohesion).
3.1. A case analysis 
In order to introduce my description of connectors, I shall point to
some problems such a description must face by discussing the fairly
14 A typical remark from the linguist is that the connectors are characterized relative to
the designators by their lack of referential function. I shall argue that not only is this fal-
se, but that there is also much more to the semantics (and pragmatics!) of the connectors
than this connection with a “logical level”.
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well-known expression but15. Consider Lakoff’s famous example:
(5) He is a republican, but honest.
A first interpretation of (5) can be formulated as follows: Take the seg-
ment preceding but to be p, and the segment after it, q, then (5) can be
analyzed as “p implies r but q, and q is non-r”, where r can be specified
as “he is not honest”. This is a very rough analysis, which could be brought
under closer scrutiny by considering the world knowledge involved in
the explication of r (cf. 2.1.) and the kinds of viewpoints involved (2.2.).
Whereas p may be bound to a single discourse individual, “p implies r”
is presented as being the statement of a general opinion (something like
“one says that republicans are not honest”).
There are some obvious problems involved in this analysis. First the
analysandum contains the analysed expression but. We might try to sub-
stitute and for but. In order to do this, and to avoid contradictions, we
should quantify “p implies r”. The point, however, is to note that such a
quantification was involved in this use of but, just as “p implies r” and
“q is non-r” were involved in the use of but in (5). In other words, the
buts in the example and in the explanation are slightly different, an
important point which should not astonish us as we go further in our ana-
lysis. Another point concerns “imply” which remains unanalysed. In this
respect we might sharpen the analysis by adopting Ducrot’s concept of
argumentative value. “p implies r” thus roughly means “p is an argument
for the conclusion r”. The important difference is that whereas “imply”
concerns the semantics of what is said, the argumentative value concerns
the way of saying, a case of the connection between the ‘what is said’
and how it is said. Thus we are back at the communicative situation, sin-
ce the argumentative value concerns an implicit viewpoint: ‘republicans
are not honest’.
A still more intriguing point is to consider that p could “imply” a lot
of propositions, or none, e.g. as an answer to the question what is his
political membership?. It is only after reading (or hearing) “but q” that p
implies r. The same remarks are true of q. That is, p and q get new inter-
pretations through their combination in “p but q”. Thus the whole is
15 I shall only discuss the use of but corresponding to the German aber (Spanish sino or
Swedish men) and not the use which corresponds to sondern (pero/utan), nor the
“exclusive use” we find in expressions like nobody but John. However, one should
appreciate the interpretative ability of speakers who manage to make the difference rou-
tinely. Anscombre & Ducrot (1977) studies the syntactic and semantic differences be-
tween the two uses of the French mais corresponding to the aber/sondern distinction.
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somehow more than the parts. This fact is hard to reconcile with the cur-
rent logical approach which uses as a method Frege’s composition axiom
(cf. Nef 1988).
Still another aspect makes logic a poor model. Consider the following
example:
(6) Everybody says that Peter knows a lot about French
wine. Indeed you should have seen him when we did
France last year. He told (…). But yesterday I served
him a Turkish wine, and he thought it was a Bordeaux.
In (6) it is “Everybody says … wine” and “yesterday … Bordeaux”
which are opposed. Actually p (and sometimes q) may not only be
located several utterances away, it may even be other kinds of semantic
units than propositional contents of utterances. For that reason Ducrot
(1980a, 17) uses X and Y for the segments around but, and p and q for the
semantic units which function as arguments. I shall come back to this
point in the third section.
To sum up let me stress the crucial points: It is not r and non-r which
are opposed by but, but the semantic units p and q. However, to work out
the opposition, the r has first to be searched for. This means that q stands
in opposition to p, not on the sentence level, i.e. in the sense, but on the
utterance level: First I said p and now I say q. But is an articulation of
speech production itself. It is therefore no wonder that the semantic units
but is operating on can be from analytically distinct levels. In natural lan-
guage connectors seem to be used with instructions governing the selec-
tion of their arguments in situ, a feature which is specifically missing in
logic, where this is avoided through explicit rules governing operators
and a standard format of distribution for the arguments.
3.2. Pointing functions 
The observation that X may not coincide with p indicates that but is
used with an instruction to look backwards in order to find some seman-
tic unit which can serve as argument. Thus but is used “about” some set
of expressions as far as they can be interpreted as arguments. It is of
course not a referential function, since but is not a name, nor is it used in
any metalinguistic sense. Its status could be described in classical logic
as of a higher type than the expressions which serve as arguments. In
natural language, this means that it is syntactically placed within seg-
ments of sentences at the same time as it works on them as an organizing
and combinatorial device. It is organizing because it connects segments
of discourse which otherwise would not be connected explicitly, and it is
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combinatorial as it requires a semantic operation. Inspired by C.S. Peir-
ce’s work in semeiotics (cf. Peirce 1960), I propose to speak here about
pointing functions. I choose the term “pointing” because it conveys the
idea that the connectors are about other parts of the same discourse, whose
location is relative to that of the connector16.
Now, these discourse parts may be of very different kinds. A sentence
or a whole section can begin with but, and one has to look for whole pie-
ces of discourse, which may be another section, or even non-verbal beha-
viour (see 4.3.). The consequent, q, too, may not be verbalized as in He
is a republican, but …, where the guessing game goes the other way
round: you have to imagine not only q, but also r, and there is a specific
open-endedness which is related to the kind of transformation but per-
forms on the semantics of p.
But before we consider that aspect, we should notice that the pointing
function is never random with respect to the locational instruction: p
always has to be found before but, and q after it. “Before” and “after” are
expressions which exhibit the linear, serial production of action and talk,
i.e. the social organization of activities, the syntax, text structure, turn
taking, etc., in which but is placed. Formators are not instructions about
how to see or to act upon the world outside of language. They are in-
structions about language production as a proper activity in time and
with its own time.
It should be emphasized that what I call the pointing function is in fact
a locational rule, not the actually performed moves of interpretation.
Thus, it may very well be the case that in order to locate p, as in example
(6), we first have to hear q. This fact concerns what Garfinkel (1967,
ch.3) calls the documentary method of interpretation: the method used by
speakers which consists in retrospective and prospective use of items in
order to see of which meaning they are a document, at the same time as
this meaning serves as a device in order to interpret, and in our case to
locate, appropriate items. Both rules, the pointing and the interpretative
method, are only specified in situ, but the first one is specific for a given
connector, whereas the second one is quite general as it is used for the
interpretation of any social action. We thus find again the famous Grice-
16 Deictic might have been a better term, but there are at least two reasons for rejecting
it. First Peirce himself confused deictic and referential functions (cf. Burks 1949), and
second - and worse - the pointing function in question not only covers what is normally
called deictic but also what is called anaphoric relations in present-day linguistics (e.g.
Kleiber 1988). Therefore I needed to find a “neutral” term.
82
an distinction between conventional and conversational implicatures (cf.
Grice 1975).
3.3. Iconic functions 
What I propose to call the iconic function of connectors is what led
students of these expressions to propose logic as a model for their analy-
sis (e.g. Montague 1974; Posner 1980). I use the term iconic for the ope-
rational aspect of connectors because “a great distinguishing property of
the icon is that by the direct observation of it other truths concerning its
objects can be discovered than those which suffice to determine its con-
struction” (Peirce 1960, 279). This seems to me a good characterization
of the general way in which expressions like but function: By introdu-
cing but between he is a republican and he is honest, you do not learn
anything new about but, but a lot about the two sentences. This is a
further reason for using Peirce’s terminology, as it allows us to say that
connectors are not symbols, since they are not full signs: they do not say
anything about the world outside language; they are an essential resource
for semantic units in their function as full signs17.
Posner (1980, 190) was right in emphasizing that the “raison d’etre of
and lies in its combinatorial function and not in its connecting function”.
This remark may be generalized to the entire set of connectors. But then
we are only speaking of their iconic function. Actually, Posner missed
the pointing function of and. But he observed another interesting feature:
The combination which is involved in the iconic function of the connec-
tors does not necessarily have to apply to truth values. He noted that the
same combination is obtained with “It’s nice … and …” or “It’s too bad
that … and …”. Thus, the combination is not specific with regard to the
kind of value which is involved, nor, as we have seen, with regard to the
location of the arguments, nor, as we shall see, to the syntactic category
of its arguments. As to this last point, we observed in section 2.2. (exam-
ple (3)) that it may even transform the previous hierarchization of a sen-
tence. Notwithstanding all this variability, the iconic function is in some
sense context-free (cf. 4.3.). Thus I have analysed the iconic structure of
but (cf. 3.1.), and I have acknowledged the conjunctivity as a feature of
and (2.1.). Therefore I agree with the criteria used by Posner (1980, 181;
198) that for a given interpretation of a connector, which includes the
17 This fact is nicely expressed in the framework of Relevance Theory, where the con-
nectors are shown to “impose semantic constraints on relevance”. See Diana Blakemore
(1987).
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pointing work and its variability, the Gricean tests of variability, cancel-
lability and non-detachability do apply and show the constant iconic fea-
tures. I shall come back to this point in the last section about the dual
character of connectors which are at the same time context-free and con-
text-sensitive. But first I should justify in somewhat more detail my choi-
ce of terminology.
3.4. Remarks on the choice of terminology 
One nice thing about our terminology is that it allows not only for the
possibility that other expressions will have these two functions, but
furthermore for an understanding of the symbolic function which is the
core instruction for what is called the meaning of expressions. This last
function is central for all designators18. The symbolic functions are the
main resources for the material aspects of meaning. The articles and the
quantifiers add formal specification to that function. On the other hand,
the main function of the modal expressions, which normally have a sym-
bolic function, is pointing and combinatorial. In fact, they have a range
of syntactic influence which is as broad as that of connectors, although
their iconic function is different, as it concerns the modality of the refe-
rences. Last but not least this terminology makes it easier for us to point
out and describe relations between logic and language.
4. Logic and connectors 
As logic has often been used as a model for the description of designa-
tors and more specifically of connectors, which are simply translated into
logical operators, it is important to discuss why this is not a good idea as
a matter of course (4.1.), and to account for its plausibility (4.2.).
4.1. Logic as a model 
I have already had the opportunity of hinting at certain problems this
approach must face. One difficulty for the application of logic is the
necessity to draw a distinction between the segments X, Y etc. and the
semantic units p, q etc., which necessitates a thematization of the iconic
function.
A further difficulty lies in the fact that connectors are not specific with
regard to the kind of arguments they may have. Consider the following
examples, drawn from Ducrot (1980a, 15):
18 The “categoremata” in the terminology of the schoolmen.
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(7) Peter is here, but John will not see him.
(8) Peter is here, but John should not know it.
Both utterances are susceptible to at least two different readings. (7)
can be interpreted such that the implicit r is thus John can meet him (an
interpretation which shows nicely the retrospective procedure involved,
since John was not mentioned before but). (8) can be interpreted such
that the implicit r is thus you could tell it to John. In these interpretations,
for (7), p is the fact that Peter is here, whereas for (8), p is the fact that I
tell you that Peter is here: the propositional content and the speech act,
respectively. But we can easily imagine interpretations which are the
reverse. Indeed for (7), p can be the speech act, the whole utterance thus
indicating that I, the speaker, do not approve of a meeting between Peter
and John, and for (8) p can be the propositional content (‘That Peter is
here in the neighborhood of John could lead you to believe that he should
meet John, but this is not the case’). Thus, although but is in several
instances an instruction to see an opposition between what has been said
and what is said now, the relevant interpretation of the argument is bound
to the occasion, depending upon elements of the communicative situati-
on.
This leads us to two more differences between connectors and logical
operators. First, logical operators are used in a language designed to
exclude context dependency, and presupposing mainly logical competen-
cy. Of course this frame is itself a context built in a communicative
frame. Logic is also communicative work, even if it consists in abstract
semantics. But the fact that logic has to work out such a frame ought to
prevent us from using it naively as a model for natural language, since its
most apparent properties are designed precisely in order to avoid the
most apparent properties of natural language, a fact which is acknow-
ledged by the long tradition of complaints among logicians concerning
the lack of precision, the confusion etc. of natural language. It is actually
a discussion of these problems which led Grice to introduce his theory of
implicatures (1975, 41-43). The fact is that just as logic tries to abstract
away from the context of its production, natural language uses this con-
text and organizes it, drawing upon elements of the setting and organi-
zing it (cf. Widmer 1982)19.
This is part of the second difference. Although logical demonstrations
are produced in a serial way, using spatial location as an ordering device
19 This fact is recognized and exploited in Relevance Theory, where ´contextual effect´
is a key notion.
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both within and between formulas, their interpretation is strongly atem-
poral. The truth value of a formula does not depend on its location, but
only on the explicit definitions and rules of the system. This is a main
resource for the context independence alluded to above20. In natural lan-
guage, interpretation is bound to the same time of reading/ listening, and
this time is not excluded from semantics, on the contrary, time is part of
the very production of meaning. Thus any but reinterprets the segment of
speech which is selected as p. It is one of the aspects of the literal mean-
ing problem that the definiteness of the interpretation of any utterance is
dependent on the occasion, because it is only on a particular occasion
that the utterance in question has a definite meaning. Consider the diffi-
culties we have in following a logical demonstration without visual sup-
port. This is due to the fact that for such a demonstration we have to resort
to the literal formulations, which we do not have to keep in our minds in
ordinary listening. In listening to natural speech, the designators and the
connectors collaborate to provide definite meaning in any context, but
the action of the rules, and hence the meaning, depends on context.
The function of connectors as organizing devices making use of the
time factor in speech production as well as the fact that they are not spe-
cific with respect to the kind of semantic units they organize apparently
raise insuperable problems for a description using logic as a model. It
therefore seems to be justified to try another approach which can handle
these problems, and this is exactly the kind of properties the pointing
function may treat, thus leaving, as we shall see, the “logic” aspects to
the iconic function.
4.2. Logic as a criterion 
It should be clear by now that I do not see logic, at least in its present
standard form, as a good model for connectors. Nevertheless, there are
obvious relations between natural connectors and logic. Peirce distingu-
ished three types of icons: image, diagrammatic and metaphoric (1960,
277ff). Image icons function through their own quality (firstness); photo-
graphs are examples. Diagrammatic icons show relations which are ana-
logous to the structure of their objects (secondness). Connectors have
such an iconic function since the moves on the utterance level are paral-
lel to the combinatorial moves which are to be performed on the seman-
20 In this century logic was first limited to a pure calculus (e.g. Wittgenstein in the
Tractatus). Later sematics was introduced because of empirical issues. But no pragma-
tics was embedded in logic.
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tic level, although the seriality of the first move may be altered in the
transformation, as with or (cf. 2.2.). Peirce specified that there is a third
kind of iconicity, the metaphorical one (thirdness), as a sign may repre-
sent something which shows parallelism to something else. This is the
case of logic with regard to natural connectors. This relation may be used
in the other sense in order to formalize part of the logical work perfor-
med in natural discourse. Indeed, if we take into consideration the fact
that the literalness of connectors increases with their power measured by
their degree of embedding (cf. 2.1.), we have a stepwise process from
natural language to logic. Through embedding, the connectors not only
cancel implicit logical work, but they also have to take into account
embedded connectors. Thus we get connectors which are used more and
more formally in the sense that the logical work performed with material
meaning gets out of focus, the logical work of the connectors becoming
conspicuous. Complete formalization takes place when there is a replace-
ment of all material meaning by expressions which display only their
pointing or “syntactic” properties. This step is taken through symboliza-
tion (e.g. pronominalization), where the expressions of natural language
are replaced by expressions which display only their syntactic category
(pronouns). As is well known, this step made the fantastic advances in
logic and mathematics possible, but it also introduced a reified version of
logic as a model of natural reasoning. By defining the logical operators
with respect to the syntactic category of their arguments, and their loca-
tion, the pointing function of these operators was made rigid and got out
of focus, since it was a prerequisite for the study of their iconic functi-
ons. Thus the analogical application of operators on different kinds of
semantic units was regarded as a nuisance, and not as an intrinsic feature
of the use of operators in natural discourse. Yet it is very interesting to
notice that such a “nuisance” could not be avoided totally even in logic.
We will see below that and as it is used by logicians in the explication of
a set makes use of the seriality of speech (4.5.). The core problem is how
we have to understand the formality of connectors in natural discourse,
their context-”freeness” and their context-sensitivity.
4.3. Context-free/context-sensitive 
What is new in the description of connectors suggested in this article
is the way in which it introduces the context. It therefore seems appropri-
ate to have a closer look at the role the context actually plays.
I have distinguished the iconic function and the pointing function. The
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iconic function corresponds in a sense to the logical aspect of the functi-
on of connectors, and the construction of logical models may be seen as a
reflexion of this function and nothing more. As such the iconic function
is context-free. It consists in introducing a semantic structure into the
interpretation, a structure made up of a (logical) relation with its argu-
ments. Ducrot’s analysis of French mais already discussed in 3.1. may
illustrate this procedure. In order to interpret an utterance containing
mais you will always have to find — independently of the actual context
— exactly three semantic units p, q and r, and to understand, not only
that p and q are both true, but also that p is arguing for the conclusion r,
q for non-r and the whole complex for non-r. The pointing function, now,
is a set of instructions for filling the slots in the semantic structure (in our
example p, q and r). In this respect the pointing function, too, is context-
free (or formal), as it always implies the same searching procedure.
On the other hand, the search procedure is context-sensitive in at least
two senses. First because it makes use of the linear format of the produc-
tion of speech: p must always be found in the context preceding but in
time. To put it otherwise, but connects what has been said to what is
going to be said, and it is thus bound to performance even though the
temporal relation between p and q is stable.
The dependence on serialization may be even more crucial in cases
where more than one but is at stake in an argumentation. Ducrot (1980b,
12) quotes a text from La Bruyère’s Les caractères, which is built up of
utterances of the type p but q, and where the permutation of any two such
pairs would change completely the meaning of the entire text21. This is
due to the fact that the final conclusion r, which — in a sense — is the
meaning, is deduced step by step, and thus depends directly on the time
factor.
The pointing function is also context-sensitive in a more important
sense. The semantic units p, q and r must fit into the structure imposed
by the iconic function. As we have seen, but introduces a sort of reinter-
pretation of p and q in so far as it forces the interpreter to find a conclu-
sion r that fits into the imposed structure. In this sense, the conclusion r
(and non-r) is introduced into the interpretation of utterances by the con-
nector but, and we may say (following Ducrot ibid., 12) that but “refers”
21 “Je vois un homme entouré et suivi: Mais il est en place. J´en vois un autre que tout
le monde aborde: mais il est en faveur. Celui-ci est embrassé et caressé, même des
grands: mais il est riche. Celui-la est regardé par tous avec curiosité: mais il est savant
et éloquent. J´en découvre un que personne n´oublie de saluer; mais il est méchant.”
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to this conclusion. Yet, the exact shape of r depends strictly on the dete-
cted semantic units p and q. But, as we have seen, p and q are by no
means necessarily identical to the properties expressed in the utterances
immediately preceding and following but. Not only may they (at least p)
be located several utterances away, but they may consist of ontologically
very different semantic types. The semantic units often derive from the
propositional content of utterances, but they may as well derive from
speech acts, and even from non-linguistic context. Consider (9):
(9) But what are you doing?
Text (9) can be a reaction to a physical action, which does not prevent
us from analysing but in (9) just like in the former examples, only, p, this
time, is a non-linguistic item, viz. an action. The corresponding French
connector mais even permits both p and q to be non-linguistic. The utter-
ance Mais! is quite common in French and is analysed by Ducrot as con-
necting two non-linguistic items.
To recapitulate: But is context-free with regard to the logical transfor-
mation (the iconic function) and with regard to the pointing function,
which consists in searching for “fillers” of the slots in the semantic struc-
ture of its iconic function. It is context-sensitive in at least two respects:
– Since there is no standardization of the syntactic location of the “fil-
lers”, the pointing function depends on the seriality of speech. 
– Since there is no standardization of the syntactic type of the “fillers”,
which may be propositions, utterance acts or non-linguistic parts of
the joint activity, the search procedures can be accomplished only if
the interpreter can find some “fillers” which make sense materially, at
the same time as they fulfil the requirements of the iconic and pointing
functions of but.
The logical work of but is therefore not detachable from the whole
semantic and communicative work in principle, although it is so in each
given case, as we saw from Posner’s analysis. This last statement calls
for a clarification of the degree to which connectors are formal.
4.4. Formality of connectors 
The analysis of and may throw light on how connectors are sensitive
even to the logical work performed on the basis of material meaning. First
we may observe that the explicit use of and is not always required, the
succession of the utterances warranting the conjunctive work to be per-
formed. The succession of utterances can represent interconnectedness
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only if the described events can be seen as connected. This point is also
maid by Posner (1980, 193) who calls this and other located connections
connexity-suggestions. These connections are exactly the kind of con-
nections which are worked out in the analysis of the material aspects of
meaning (Sacks 1974; Widmer 1983). Now, it is always possible to can-
cel such suggestions, i.e. logical work performed on the basis of the ela-
boration of material meaning, since explicit connectors take precedence
over implicit connections. That this does not necessarily imply a prefe-
rence of the analyst for explicit logical work can be shown by looking at
an example proposed by Posner (1980, 194ff):
(10) If Annie has married and has had a baby, grandfather
will be happy.
If if and and were both truth functional in the logical sense, (10)
would be true in the case where Annie has had a baby and has married,
irrespectively of the temporal order of these events. This, indeed, is not a
normal interpretation of (10). As Posner points out, the consequent clau-
se (grand father will be happy) is (normally) only considered as true if
Annie has first married and then has had the baby. So, he concludes, “the
truth of the consequent clause is dependent here upon the realization not
only of the literal meaning of the antecedent clause, but also of its suc-
cessivity suggestion”. Thus, he implies, you have to choose between the
truth functionality of the and or of the if. This implication, however,
holds only if you wish a literal meaning, and further if you confine the
logical work to the explicit work of the connectors. If we take the seman-
tic units together with the utterance acts in which they appear, and can
also connect what Posner calls suggestions, i.e. semantic units arising
from the interpretation of material meaning (in his terms, from the appli-
cation of Gricean postulates). Thus, if we admit that (10) is used sincere-
ly and with connexity and coherence, we can explicate (10) as “If Annie
has married and then has had a baby, …” or as “… a baby, and she had
the baby after the marriage, …”. The fact that and is embedded in an if-
clause does not foreclose the possibility of other logical work, since, as
we said, the canons of logic are distinct from natural language; whereas
the former try to control any operation, the latter tries to be as economi-
cal as possible. A fact that is nicely expressed in the fundamental axiom
of Relevance Theory: “Try for the greatest possible effect at the least
possible effort”. Thus Posner’s example and his interpretation of it shows
nicely how we should acknowledge that and involves conjunctivity as its
iconic function, but that we should not impose the standards of logical
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reading on the analysis of natural discourse, a point I have emphasized
throughout this article.
In addition my analysis seems to throw light on the difference between
and and but. Many linguists have proposed to analyze but as an and plus
something more. Logically and and but should be equivalent, but but also
conveys some pragmatic aspects. The intuition behind this conception is
explicated in our framework. In the case of and, the logical relation intro-
duced by the iconic function into the text is part of the more complex
logical relation introduced by but. The interpretation of but requires the
search for three arguments p, q and r, and one part of the relation between
these ones is ‘p & q’. The other parts probably cannot be expressed by
classical logic, and this fact may explain why they are felt as pragmatic.
4.5. Extension of the analyses 
It should be rather obvious how the analysis can be extended to other
linguistic connectors. It is well known from recent linguistic research
that not only conjunctions may display connector functions. Greenbaum
(1969) in fact discerned a class of adverbials in English which he calls
the conjuncts. Like the genuine conjunctions, their function is to connect
two (or more) utterances. It is true that this function is only indirect in
the case of the analytic connectors (whereas the connector function of
synthetic connectors is direct, cf. Nølke 1990b), but this fact falls outside
the analysis of the connection itself.
We may differentiate at least three main types of connectors: additives,
oppositives, and ordering connectors. The first of these classes includes
expressions like yet, however, and on the other hand. Most of them
would receive analyses similar to the one I suggested for but22. The
second class (the additives) includes expressions like furthermore, besides
and likewise. These connectors rather resemble and. The analysis of the
third class — the ordering conjuncts (finally, secondly, etc., …) —  may
be more complicated because the iconic function would concern an inde-
finite range of arguments, i.e. the pointing function has an open field
along a given list of possible arguments. Here again we are faced with
the interesting problems posed by the logicians about the nature of etc.,
and, less known, the interpretation of formulas like “a & b & c & …”,
where b is simultaneously the argument of the first and the second &.
Now, the logicians would avoid that problem by using parentheses, but
22 See e.g. Moeschler & Spengler (1981) and Gettrup & Nølke (1984) for the exact
nature of the relations introduced.
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this can be done only when the list is finished, that is, meanwhile we use
another device for interpreting the list. This device seems to take the
variables not as syntactic expressions only, but also as expressions pro-
duced in a serial way — thus these & are not transforms of pure tokens,
but of utterance acts, and it is the series of these acts which may be fol-
lowed up by etc., or closed by finally. Even expressions like to put it
otherwise, which involve a distinct viewpoint, or in short can be analyzed
in the way suggested. Only in these cases the arguments are utterance acts,
and not pure semantic units23.
I would finally like to point out a special class of expressions which
have been considered as belonging to the connectors. I have in mind
adverbials like even, only, particularly etc., which I have proposed to call
the “paradigmatic adverbials” elsewhere (Nølke 1982; 1983). Their inter-
pretation requires the introduction of a specific paradigm. Let us consider
a simple (classical) example:
(11) Even Peter came to the party.
To understand (11), you have to grasp that other persons than Peter
have come to the party. The interpretation of (11) thus involves a para-
digm of propositions, and this fact is due to the presence of even. In the
present framework we may say that the iconic function superimposes a
structure £(p,q,r) where p is the actual proposition, q an arbitrary mem-
ber of the paradigm (only q must be different from p), and r a conclusion
(in Ducrot’s sense). Note that the shape of the paradigm is restricted by
the syntax of even. To get an arbitrary member you have to change the
nucleus (in casu ‘Peter’) with a member of the same conceptual para-
digm (in casu another person who could be expected to come to my par-
ty). Now the relation (£) is something like “p is a stronger argument for
r than q is”. In our example it might be known from the situation (back-
ground knowledge) that Peter is not eager to go to parties, and then r
might be something like “My party was a great success”24.
We see that the basic principle in this analysis is quite analogous to the
one we proposed for but. The paradigmatic adverbials are in effect (indi-
rect) connectors according to the characterization given in the introduc-
tion, so this is as it should be.
23 Cf. Nølke (1990a) for an analysis of their French counterparts in the framework of
Relevance Theory.
24 This analysis of even was first proposed by Jean-Claude Anscombre (1973) for French
même.
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5. Concluding remarks 
It should be clear by now that I am not arguing against logic per se.
But what makes logic a distinct enterprise is its departure from natural
reasoning. Its use as a model reveals, as does any metaphor, important
similarities, but it also masks important differences. The proposed dis-
tinction between pointing and iconic functions of natural connectors tries
to capture how logical transformation and discourse work are bound
together.
The distinction may also be helpful for other syntactic analyses. Any
syntactic category is relational and the interpretative work of segmentati-
on can be seen as based on the pointing function of categories, a pointing
function which may explain determination as well as indeterminacy. It
may help in particular to illuminate some aspects of oral discourse which
appears not to respect in all cases the rule according to which any item
corresponds to only one syntactic category, as recent work on socalled
syntactic double–bind has shown (Frank 1982; Widmer 1982, 250-56).
This distinction may capture also the suggestion of Alain Berrendon-
ner (1983) that there is an analogy between anaphora and connectors.
Both show similar context-sensitivity with regard to the location and the
type of the “fillers” of their pointing slots. The main difference, which
Berrendonner neglected, is that the iconic function of anaphora is not
transformational but substitutional. It concerns the extraction of identical
aspects of material meanings and is hence truth conditional.
Of course, much work still has to be done. My aim was not to explore
the whole domain, but mainly to emphasise that there is much more work
involved in the semantic study of connectors than merely stating their
truth tables. These items in fact supply important clues for the construc-
tion of sentence meaning; and although they are peculiar, their peculiari-
ty does not lie in their context-freeness, but in the special way they orga-
nize and are organized by the ongoing flow of meaning25. 
25 I am deeply obliged to Professor Bent Jacobsen who has struggled with this text in
order to make my English readable.
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